Continued from yesterday
By Toyin Falola
Morocco
Motivated by the unfavorable assessment of Morocco’s human rights record by the US State Department, the kingdom sought to deepen relations with Russia in 2002. It started with a first-time visit by Mohammed VI, and the focus was the countries’ free trade agreement. There was also the subject of expanding Russian access to Moroccan fisheries in an effort to shift from the United States. But the relationship has existed for far longer than this. Russo-Moroccan ties stretch as far back as 1777, when leaders from both states communicated through letters.
In the twenty-first century, both have expressed commitments through visits to each other’s countries — twice in two decades by the Moroccan monarch and once in 2006 by Vladimir Putin. Though interjected by Morocco’s efforts to maintain its partnership with the West, Rabat and Moscow have interacted on issues cutting across military and economic sectors. Recently, the two nations signed eleven agreements in a single day, indicating a willingness to further relations. Moscow once offered its sophisticated missile defence system to Morocco and has also stated its intention to assist in constructing thermal power plants in the country.
Similarly, Russia expressed its readiness to support the construction of a gas terminal in Morocco’s Jorf Lasfar. The estimated spend for this project is in the region of $2 billion. And even as they continue to make strides in their energy and military agreements, the sides have progressed in economic depth. In 2016, trade volume between Russia and Morocco stood at $3 billion. Exports from the country to Russia in 2019 were estimated at $286 million, with imports at $1.3 billion. A 20 percent increase in Russian exports to Morocco was also recorded in the first half of 2021. Morocco being Russia’s second-largest trading partner in the Arab world demonstrates how far they have both gone in terms of economic cooperation.
Like its North African counterparts, Morocco imports grain from Russia and Ukraine. The country is in a more secure position as it possesses substantial reserves to hedge against the conflict, unlike others. In 2020, it imported close to $300 million worth of Ukrainian grain and $110 million of Russia’s. Morocco’s ties with Russia are further symbolized by the popularity of Moroccan citrus fruits. Its oranges are a regular part of Russia’s new year festivities, adding grassroots meaning to the relationship. This dynamic puts Morocco in a fix between its western loyalties and its bond with Russia. This was evident in its refusal to participate in a UN vote to criticize Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Asides from grain, Russia’s mineral, chemical, and energy exports will be affected. This is as Morocco is highly dependent on imported energy, with 90 percent of its needs augmented by external sources. There is also the possibility that Morocco’s tourist car exports to Russia and Ukraine will be affected. According to data by the Moroccan Exchange Office, the sector witnessed a 12.8 percent increase in 2021.
Yet, the situation is not utterly bleak. Research has indicated that Morocco may gain from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Phosphate, an essential ingredient in manufacturing fertilizers, is one product the country has in abundance. The war already limits Russia’s exports, setting the stage for entry by fresh suppliers. Morocco’s phosphate reserves are estimated at 50 billion tons, making it the second-largest in the world after China. Its stock also constitutes 72 percent of the total reserves available globally. Morocco’s position is enhanced by the presence of the OCP Group, a phosphate production giant in the country. The company’s logistical and production capabilities have been instrumental to Rabat’s emergence. OCP Group recorded $9 billion in profits in 2021 and is set to increase production by 10 percent in 2022. The country is already receiving attention as India looks to procure more phosphate to supplement its reserves.
Algeria
Algeria’s relationship with the Russian Federation dates back to its independence years. Algeria had fought a brutal eight-year war with France before finally securing autonomy. Since then, Moscow and Algiers have been diplomatic partners, with the Soviet Union lending billions of dollars to the Arab country. In 2001, both signed a declaration of strategic partnership, and five years later, Algeria became Africa’s biggest buyer of Russian arms. The weapons deal worth $7.5 billion in that year has expanded into several arms purchases in 2010, 2012, 2013, and 2015. It has continued with these purchases, with a recent agreement running into scores of Russian military equipment. Between 2014-and 2018, Moscow supplied as much as 66 percent of Algeria’s arsenal. Sales to Algeria alone constitute half of Russia’s entire weapons sales to the African continent. The Russo-Algerian partnership has also extended to counter-terrorism operations, with both countries exchanging intelligence on terrorist activities in North Africa.
Algeria is not only a crucial military partner, but it also shares some ideological similarities with Russia. The two nations have a tender spot for authoritarian rule and are quick to dispatch any opposition to their dictates. The 2019 Algerian riots provide a classic study of Russia’s interest in a non-democratic leadership. While Moscow chose to refrain from direct interference, its body language suggested a desire for leaders with little regard for Western leadership principles. Similarities can also be found in the South African and Algerian cases highlighted earlier. Due to its colonial experience, the latter consistently maintains opposition to actions violating territorial sovereignty. It is equally reactive to occasions that appear to threaten its sovereignty. Lending weight to this principled nature is the Algerian capital’s reputation as the “Mecca of the revolutionaries.” However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has attracted reticence on Algeria’s part. The country was among the 35 nations that abstained from the UN resolution condemning the invasion. This position implies Algeria’s preference for a smooth relationship with Russia.
There is also the issue of distrust of the West’s intentions in Algerian circles. The US-led diplomatic coalition against Russia is accused of double standards in its treatment of the conflict. Still, the picture is not so simple. Even with its seeming friendliness, Algeria maintains a fair connection to the West. An example is its membership of the Mediterranean Dialogue, despite lacking a designation as a major non-NATO ally. Remaining in the Dialogue for two decades alongside Morocco, Israel, and other players in the Middle East is an indication that the West views it as an essential partner. Algeria also collaborates on counter-terrorism efforts but has refrained from engaging in conflict areas.
On the economic end, Russia and Algeria partner on the latter’s abundant energy sector. The Russian company, Gazprom, had won several contracts for exploration and development, but Russia’s position as the European Union’s largest gas supplier cast doubts on the potential of this relationship. Russia singlehandedly supplies 16 percent of Europe’s gas, with Algeria trailing behind. In 2021, 83 percent of Algeria’s gas exports headed to Europe, Italy, and Spain, receiving 65 percent of that intake. The country has three pipelines conveying gas to Europe, out of which two are active. Transmed, the largest of the two, has a capacity of 32 billion cubic meters (bcm), with 22 billion bcm used. The second, MedGaz, conveys gas to Spain. Algeria is one of the world’s largest producers of natural gas, and it hopes to wield this position in replacing Russia in the EU. Preoccupied with war and economic sanctions, Russia’s gas supply is severely impacted, leading to a surge in energy prices and forcing European nations to find new markets. Algeria positions itself as a ready alternative and is already receiving yields along that line. Italy has entered new supply deals already, and government revenues are expected to record an uptick. Algerian oil now sells for five times its value in April 2020 during the height of the pandemic. And to establish itself in the European market, it is moving towards a rise in production levels.
However, despite Algeria’s apparent prospects, its ability to fill Russia’s void is in doubt. Sonatrach, the state-run energy company, has been wracked by mismanagement and leadership instability. The company has had seven CEOs in ten years, and operators in the energy sector decry bureaucratic bottlenecks and unfavorable policies. There is also the technical aspect wherein active extraction fields are already at near-maximum production capacity, and a supply increase would require the exploration of new fields. Here, again, Algeria confronts issues. The North African region is experiencing an extended drought, and water scarcity threatens stability. Attempts by the government to explore local communities may be met by stiff resistance, one which it is looking to avoid.
In addition, local consumption of energy products has risen beyond previous levels. Between 2013 and 2018, domestic gas usage increased by 10 percent, and the figure is projected to reach 50 percent by 2028. While Algeria has made advances in the utilization of renewable energy, these efforts are too minimal to augment local energy consumption. Nonetheless, Algeria’s willingness to exploit the opening was palpable in its reaction. Before the war, the government instituted measures to cut subsidies totaling $17 billion during years of peak oil prices and planned tax increases. The pandemic dented its revenues further, and its foreign currency reserves took a dive. But once prices began to rise, the government reversed its position on taxation and subsidies and set up a stipend for unemployed youth. Algeria has argued that it will be unaffected by the absence of grain imports from Russia and Ukraine. Yet, there is some skepticism around this. It is expected that rising food prices will counteract Algeria’s gains in the energy sector. There are also debates on Moscow’s view of its partner’s plans to replace it in the European market.
The War and Other African Countries
Although North Africa is unique in terms of its climate, political, and staple food peculiarities, countries in other African regions are affected in some similar ways. For example, imports provide 84 percent of wheat demand in East Africa. Russia and Ukraine supply 90 percent of the wheat in the region. Therefore, like their North African counterparts, East African countries are expected to feel some of the war’s impacts. However, depending on the level of dependence, impacts will vary across countries. The situation in Kenya is likely to have a political undertone as parties settle into the election year. Citizens are forced to pay higher prices for fuel and food, and politicians will be looking to manipulate the crisis to their advantage or incite outrage for doing nothing. Kenya’s export of tea, coffee, flowers, and fruits worth around $88 million has been affected by Western sanctions on Russia. Its grain imports from Russia and Ukraine will also take a hit as the countries implement an export ban. Buyers from Russia, the fifth largest consumer of Kenyan tea, were noticeably absent at an exhibition of Kenyan agricultural products to potential export partners.
Nigeria, Africa’s largest economy, has refrained from a pointed criticism of Russia. Since its vote in support of the UN resolution, Nigeria has focused on evacuating its students from the embattled country. The West African nation is similarly expected to reap gains from the rise in energy prices. It slid into a recession that lasted several years after an oil price crash in 2014. Its economy has also been affected by the coronavirus, truncating efforts at revival. The war is expected to reflect on the Ajaokuta steel mines project, which was slated to receive Russian inputs.
Countries like Mali and the Central Africa Republic may witness a diversion of Russian attention to its war effort. In CAR, Russian mercenaries from Wagner Group, the private military company headed by Yevgeny Prigozhin and believed to be a state proxy, are assisting its counterterror efforts. Russia’s involvement in the Republic is seen as an attempt to frustrate the French, who have been active in the region for years. There is also the ulterior motive of exploiting CAR’s minerals as a quid pro quo for the military backing.
In Mali, the situation is not much different. The Malian military junta headed by Assimi Goita ousted the democratically elected government of Ibrahim Boubacar Keita. And while the action has seen some support at the grassroots, there are insinuations that the coup was influenced by Russia. The coup leaders had been on a training programme in Russia, only to execute the overthrow within a week of their return. Regardless, the coup comes on the back of growing discontent at the presence of French troops in the country. Locals perceive the French as reminders of their colonial history and doubt their ability to end terrorism. Aiding this are grumbles against the utilization of the CFA Franc, a currency pegged to the Euro and controlled by France’s central bank. This economic bond is seen as a neocolonization effort, a continuous target of dissatisfaction. The junta has asked that France and its European allies withdraw their troops, paving the path for the entry of Russian mercenaries. A possible connection has also been established between the Burkinabe coup leader, Colonel Henri-Paul Sandaogo Damiba and Goita of Mali. Both were said to have received Russian military training, and Damiba was stated to have pushed for the engagement of Russian mercenaries in the local security crisis weeks before the coup.
Africa’s Relationship with Europe in the Context of the War
Africa’s partnership with Europe has been punctuated by promises and refreshed agreements for many years. There is distrust in Europe’s dedication to fulfilling its promises and a leaning toward Chinese and Russian powers as a result. There are also stringent loan requirements that countries find difficult to meet, particularly the assessment of human rights records. A less officious partner is found in China, whose loan terms and investment commitments over the years are viewed as outstripping Europe’s.
Although Russia lags well behind investments by Europe and the United States, abstentions by African countries at the UN are argued to have been informed by a desire for balance. Countries in Africa and the Middle East would rather maintain the bipolar world order than a circumstance where the US is solely dominant. African nations are also unwilling to return to the Cold War era when loyalties were corralled to either side of the divide. Maintaining relations with the US and Russia helps secure countries’ positions, preventing a reliance on one single power. However, it is notable that African abstentions dropped from 26 during the annexation of Crimea in 2014 to 17 during a full-scale invasion. Analysts have suggested that the reasons are not farfetched; while African nations are particular about their diplomatic relationships, breaches of sovereignty are untenable to them. This is as many African nations that possess little in terms of military might and are averse to compromising any country’s territorial integrity.
A potential impact of the war on Europe-Africa relations is the diversion of critical foreign aid from the African continent. The European Union (EU) will likely increase financial support to Ukraine in the aftermath of the war, and money committed to investing in Africa will reduce. The EU also has to tackle the pre-existing effects of the pandemic and the long-term impacts of the war on prices and various economic sectors. It will concentrate on reorienting its trade relationships such that dependence on actors like Russia is minimal. These efforts are certain to reflect on Africa.
Nevertheless, there are trust gaps to be filled. The stance of the United States and Europe comes with a hypocritical lining. The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 and its reaction during the Cuban missile crisis of the Cold War cast doubts on the honesty of their position. Even closer to home is the more recent invasion of Libya, from which the country continues to stagger. Many may also feel uncertain about the outcome of a weakened Russia, a dynamic that is sure to benefit no other than the West itself. Thus, in the face of an unreliable partnership, African nations have to decide what best works for them.
It would also be remiss to exclude the condescension of the West to Africa’s foreign policy. Rather than acknowledge the reasons for discontent, the West finds it convenient to talk African nations into “seeing reason.” Diplomats are quick to note the benefits of taking sides with the American position while playing down the specific interests and concerns of their African counterparts. Added to this are reactions in Western media to conflict in Europe. Journalists commenting on the situation personify Africa and the Middle East as the natural epicenters of conflict. Fault lines have also been exposed in the Ukrainian security officials’ racist treatment of foreign students. The combination of these factors inquires into the West’s view of Africa. The fact that there are different interpretations means that perceptions of the West by individual African countries will vary. These perceptions may impact foreign policy in the future.
Conclusion
Using particular countries as case studies, the essay has examined the impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war. By referring to the peculiarities of these countries, it has shown how the level of connectedness dictates effects. For a more balanced view, countries with profit potential were also included. Therefore, it is submitted that African nations will absorb international shocks based on their relationships with specific circumstances.
*Prof Falola presented this as part of the Talking Points at the International Colloquium on Russia-Ukraine War and Implication For Global Security, Peace and New World Order, organized by the Centre for Black Culture and Understanding, Osogbo, Nigeria, on March 22, 2022.
